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Xin l\u01b0u-\u00fd<\/b>: V\u00ec l\u00fd-do chuy\u00ean-m\u00f4n, k\u1ec3 t\u1eeb k\u1ef3 n\u00e0y b\u1ea3n Vi\u1ec7t-ng\u1eef l\u00e0 b\u1ea3n t\u00f3m t\u1eaft nh\u1eefng \u00fd ch\u00ednh. \u0110\u1ed9c-gi\u1ea3 mu\u1ed1n bi\u1ebft th\u00eam chi-ti\u1ebft xin tham-kh\u1ea3o ph\u1ea7n Anh-ng\u1eef. Th\u1ef1c ra ngay c\u1ea3 ph\u1ea7n Anh-ng\u1eef c\u0169ng v\u1eabn c\u1ea7n b\u1ed5-t\u00fac r\u1ea5t nhi\u1ec1u. Xin c\u1ea3m-\u01a1n \u0111\u1ed9c-gi\u1ea3<\/i>. NQ
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Th\u1ef1c ra ch\u00fang ta v\u1eabn ch\u01b0a r\u00f5 \u00fd<\/b> c\u00faa Wittgenstein khi \u00f4ng b\u00e0n v\u1ec1 v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 \u201cK\u1ef3-b\u00ed\u201d, khi \u00f4ng n\u00f3i: 6.522 Es gibt allerdings Unausprectliches. Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische. Th\u01b0c v\u1eady, c\u00f3 nh\u1eefng \u0111i\u1ec1u kh\u00f4ng sao di\u1ec5n-t\u1ea3 \u0111\u01b0\u1ee3c b\u1eb1ng l\u1eddi, t\u1ef1 ch\u00fang hi\u1ec7n ra, n\u00ean ch\u00fang ta g\u1ecdi ch\u00fang l\u00e0 \u0111i\u1ec1u K\u1ef3-b\u00ed.<\/i> Ch\u01b0a ho\u00e0n to\u00e0n \u0111\u00fang. C\u00f3 nh\u1eefng \u0111i\u1ec1u ch\u00fang ta bi\u1ebft r\u00f5 nh\u01b0ng thi\u1ebfu t\u1eeb ng\u1eef \u0111\u1ec3 mi\u00eau-t\u1ea3. Ho\u1eb7c t\u1eeb-ng\u1eef c\u1ea7n \u0111i theo h\u00ecnh-\u0111\u1ed3, v\u00ed d\u1ee5: Qu\u1ef9-t\u00edch. C\u00e1c d\u1eabn-ch\u1ee9ng trong khoa-h\u1ecdc kh\u00f4ng th\u1ec3 di\u1ec5n-t\u1ea3 b\u1eb1ng l\u1eddi, ch\u00fang hi\u1ec7n ra trong ph\u00f2ng th\u00ed-ngi\u1ec7m ho\u1eb7c linh-\u0111\u1ed9ng trong \u00e1p-d\u1ee5ng nh\u01b0 l\u00e0 \u0111\u1eddi s\u1ed1ng (virtual), ch\u1eb3ng h\u1ea1n phi-thuy\u1ec1n Voyager. Virtual philosophy l\u00e0 tri\u1ebft-h\u1ecdc v\u1ec1 s\u1ef1 suy-ngh\u0129 v\u00e0 ho\u1ea1t-\u0111\u1ed9ng, nh\u01b0 vi-t\u00ednh, th\u01b0\u1eddng \u0111\u01b0\u1ee3c g\u1ecdi l\u00e0 \u201cartificial intelligence.\u201d Ho\u1ea1t-\u0111\u1ed9ng \u1ea5y, \u0111\u1eddi-s\u1ed1ng \u1ea5y kh\u00f4ng ph\u1ea3i l\u00e0 \u0111i\u1ec1u K\u1ef3-b\u00ed. Ho\u1ea1 ch\u0103ng ch\u00ednh kh\u1ed1i \u00f3c c\u1ee7a con ng\u01b0\u1eddi l\u00e0 \u0111i\u1ec1u K\u1ef3-b\u00ed.<\/p>\n
\u00dd-ni\u1ec7m v\u1ec1 K\u1ef3-b\u00ed trong Th\u1ea7n-h\u1ecdc l\u00e0 t\u01b0\u1edfng-t\u01b0\u1ee3ng c\u1ee7a con ng\u01b0\u1eddi. Cho n\u00ean n\u00f3 kh\u00f4ng c\u00f3 gi\u00e1-tr\u1ecb v\u1ec1 ki\u1ebfn-th\u1ee9c v\u00ec th\u1ebf n\u00f3 kh\u00f4ng ph\u1ea3i l\u00e0 \u0111i\u1ec1u Wittgenstein quan-t\u00e2m v\u00ec \u00f4ng suy-ngh\u0129 trong tinh-th\u1ea7n khoa-h\u1ecdc th\u1ef1c-ch\u1ee9ng (Positivism). Nh\u01b0ng v\u00ec qu\u00e1 n\u1eb7ng v\u1ec1 Lu\u1eadn-l\u00fd n\u00ean \u00f4ng \u0111\u00e3 ngh\u0129 ti\u1ebfng chim h\u00f3t c\u0169ng c\u00f3 l\u00fd-t\u00ednh. N\u00f3i nh\u01b0 th\u1ebf ch\u1ec9 l\u00e0 \u0111\u1ec5 n\u00f3i ch\u1ee9 kh\u00f4ng ph\u1ea3i l\u00e0 \u00fd-th\u1ee9c. Trong th\u1eddi v\u0103n-ch\u01b0ong Ti\u1ec1n-chi\u1ebfn \u1edf Vi\u1ec7t-nam, c\u00f3 m\u1ed9t nh\u00e0 th\u01a1 (d\u01b0\u1eddng nh\u01b0 l\u00e0 Xu\u00e2n-di\u1ec7u) \u0111\u00e3 nh\u1eadn x\u00e9t v\u1ec1 ti\u00eang chim th\u1ebf n\u00e0y: \u201cK\u00eau t\u1ef1-nhi\u00ean n\u00e0o bi\u1ebft b\u1edfi sao k\u00eau<\/i>!\u201d Th\u1ef1c ra v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 \u201ck\u1ef3-b\u00ed\u201d ch\u1ec9 th\u1ea5y hay c\u1ea3m th\u1ea5y r\u1ed3i \u0111\u01b0\u1ee3c tr\u01b0ng ra ch\u1ee9 kh\u00f4ng th\u1ec3 c\u1eaft-ngh\u0129a d\u01b0\u1ee3c. Nh\u1eadn-\u0111\u1ecbnh nh\u01b0 th\u1ebf ch\u1eafc Russell kh\u00f4ng c\u00f2n th\u1eafc-m\u1eafc. Nh\u01b0ng Russell v\u1eabn c\u00f3 l\u00fd-do b\u1edfi c\u00e1i g\u00ec ch\u00fang ta kh\u00f4ng bi\u1ebft th\u00ec ch\u00fang ta n\u00eau l\u00ean l\u00e0m g\u00ec, nh\u1ea5t l\u00e0 trong m\u1ed9t lu\u1eadn-c\u01b0\u01a1ng v\u1ec1 lu\u1eadn-l\u00fd v\u00e0 ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef. Wittgenstein c\u0169ng c\u00f3 l\u00fd-do ri\u00eang khi \u00f4ng ch\u1ee3t th\u1ea5y c\u00f3 v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 k\u1ef3 l\u1ea1, b\u1ea5t-ng\u1edd. Ch\u1ec9 c\u00f3 \u0111i\u1ec1u \u00f4ng kh\u00f4ng b\u00e0n th\u00eam v\u1ec1 t\u00ednh-ch\u1ea5t l\u1ea1-l\u00f9ng g\u1ecdi l\u00e0 K\u1ef3-b\u00ed. N\u00ean nh\u1edb tr\u01b0ng ra hi\u1ec7n-t\u01b0\u1ee3ng K\u1ef3-b\u00ed kh\u00e1c v\u1edbi c\u1eaft-ngh\u0129a m\u1ed9t hi\u1ec7n-t\u01b0\u1ee3ng K\u1ef3-b\u00ed (It is difference between showing and understanding the mystical). <\/p>\n
Ecstasy l\u00e0 m\u1ed9t t\u00ecnh tr\u1ea1ng l\u1ea1-l\u00f9ng, n\u1eeda t\u1ec9nh n\u1eeda m\u00ea, thi\u00ean v\u1ec1 \u0111\u1ee9c-tin v\u00e0 t\u00e2m-l\u00fd. Nh\u01b0 v\u1eb7y, Ecstasy c\u1ecf ph\u1ea3i l\u00e0 hi\u1ec7n-t\u01b0\u1ee3ng k\u1ef3-b\u00ed kh\u00f4ng? Kh\u00f4ng! Ecstasy ch\u1ec9 l\u00e0 hoang-t\u01b0\u1edfng (hallucination). B\u1ee9c t\u01b0\u1ee3ng n\u1eef-th\u00e1nh Theresa c\u1ee7a Bernini \u0111\u01b0\u1ee3c mi\u00eau-t\u1ea3 r\u00f5 r\u00e0ng v\u1ec1 s\u1ef1 th\u0103ng-hoa qua \u0111\u1ea5ng thi\u00eang-li\u00eang v\u00e0 ch\u1ec9 \u0111\u1ebfn m\u1ee9c to\u00e0n-v\u1eb9n khi tr\u00e1i tim b\u1ecb m\u0169i t\u00ean c\u1eafm v\u00e0o. \u0110\u00f3 l\u00e0 l\u00fac tuy\u1ec7t-v\u1eddi n\u00ean x\u00e1c-th\u00e2n kh\u00f4ng c\u1ea3m th\u1ea5y g\u00ec. Ecstasy l\u00e0 m\u1ed9t tr\u1ea1ng-th\u00e1i \u201cl\u00ean-\u0111\u1ed3ng\u201d ho\u00e0n to\u00e0n v\u00f4 \u00fd-th\u1ee9c, nh\u01b0ng \u0111\u01b0\u1ee3c h\u1eadu-thu\u1eabn c\u1ee7a \u0111\u1ee9c-tin hay d\u1ecb-\u0111oan, nh\u01b0 tr\u01b0\u1eddng-h\u1ee3p n\u1eef-th\u00e1nh Theresa. Ch\u00fang ta kh\u00f4ng hi\u1ec3u Bernini c\u00f3 \u1ea9n-\u00fd g\u00ec khi \u00f4ng th\u00eam v\u00e0o t\u00e1c-ph\u1ea9m m\u1ed9t thi\u00ean-th\u1ea7n v\u1edbi n\u1ee5 c\u01b0\u1eddi \u201ckh\u00f3ai t\u1ec9\u201d s\u1eafp s\u1eeda c\u1eafm m\u0169i t\u00ean v\u00e0o tim th\u00e1nh Theresa. T\u1ef1a h\u1ed3 nh\u01b0 thi\u00ean-th\u1ea7n mu\u1ed1n n\u00f3i: \u201cLi\u1ec7u c\u00f3 \u0111au kh\u00f4ng?\u201d ho\u1eb7c \u201cLi\u1ec7u c\u00f3 \u00fd-th\u1ee9c g\u00ec kh\u00f4ng?\u201d Ho\u1eb7c l\u00e0 m\u1ed9t c\u00e1ch mu\u1ed1n t\u00ecm s\u1ef1-th\u1ef1c: \u201cC\u00f3 th\u1eadt Ecstasy kh\u00f4ng?\u201d<\/p>\n
\u00dd-th\u1ee9c l\u00e0 ho\u1ea1t-\u0111\u1ed9ng t\u1ef1-nhi\u00ean c\u1ee7a tr\u00ed-tu\u00ea, nh\u01b0 khi ch\u00fang ta \u0111\u1eb7t c\u00e2u h\u1ecfi v\u1ec1 Th\u01b0\u1ee3ng-\u0111\u1ebf hay T\u1ea1o-h\u00f3a, t\u1ee9c l\u00e0 \u0111\u1ee5ng v\u00e0o B\u1ea3n-th\u1ec3 v\u00f4-bi\u00ean. Nh\u01b0ng suy ra t\u1eeb \u0111o\u1ea1n m\u1edf-\u0111\u1ea7u c\u1ee7a chuy\u00ean lu\u1eadn n\u00e0y, \u00fd-th\u1ee9c l\u00e0 th\u1ee9c v\u1ec1 m\u1ecdi v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1, ngay c\u1ea3 \u00fd-th\u1ee9c v\u1ec1 th\u1ebf-gian h\u1eefu-h\u1ea1n, v\u1ec1 con ng\u01b0\u1eddi, v\u1ec1 v\u1ea1n-v\u1eadt, v\u1ec1 l\u1ecbch-s\u1eed, v\u1ec1 ch\u00ednh-tr\u1ecb v\u00e0 v\u1ec1 x\u00e3-h\u1ed9i\u2026\u00dd-th\u1ee9c kh\u00f4ng bao gi\u1edd to\u00e0n-v\u1eb9n, ngay c\u1ea3 nh\u1eefng chuy\u1ec7n nh\u1ecf b\u00e9 h\u1eb1ng ng\u00e0y nh\u01b0, c\u00e1i b\u00ecnh-\u0111\u00ee\u1ec7n xe h\u01a1i n\u00e0y l\u00e0m \u1edf \u0111\u00e2u, c\u00f3 b\u1ea3o-\u0111\u1ea3m \u0111\u00fang h\u1ea1n-k\u1ef3 kh\u00f4ng. <\/p>\n
C\u0169ng v\u1eady, s\u1ef1 K\u1ef3-b\u00ed kh\u00f4ng ch\u1ec9 n\u1eb1m trong v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 v\u00f4-h\u1ea1n m\u00e0 c\u00f2n l\u00e0 v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 h\u1eefu-h\u1ea1n, v\u00ed d\u1ee5 nh\u1eefng c\u00e1i b\u1ea5t ng\u1edd. Chuy\u1ec7n b\u1ea5t-ng\u1edd kh\u00f4ng ph\u1ea3i lu\u00f4n lu\u00f4n l\u00e0 chuy\u1ec7n trong t\u01b0\u01a1ng-quan c\u1ee7a \u201cnh\u00e2n-qu\u1ea3\u201d, c\u1ee7a t\u00e1c d\u1ee5ng b\u00ean ngo\u00e0i \u0111\u00e3 t\u1ea1o th\u00e0nh nh\u1eefng v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 nh\u01b0 l\u1ecbch-s\u1eed v\u00e0 x\u00e3-h\u1ed9i khi\u1ebfn ch\u00fang ta th\u1eafc m\u1eafc. V\u00ed-d\u1ee5, ngh\u0129a ch\u00ednh c\u1ee7a t\u1eeb-ng\u1eef Animalism c\u00f3 ngh\u0129a \u201ccon-ng\u01b0\u1eddi kh\u00f4ng h\u01a1n con v\u1eadt\u201d. T\u1eeb \u00fd-th\u1ee9c \u0111\u00f3, Animalism li\u00ean-quan \u0111\u1ebfn c\u1ea3m-x\u00fac trong t\u00e2m-l\u00fd v\u00e0 trong t\u00ednh-d\u1ee5c. Ch\u00fang ta c\u00f3 th\u1ec3 bi\u1ebft c\u1ea3m-x\u00fac suy ra t\u1eeb kinh-nghi\u1ec7m ho\u1eb7c t\u1eeb m\u1eaft th\u1ea5y tai nghe. Nh\u01b0ng c\u1eaft ngh\u0129a \u00fd-th\u1ee9c v\u1ec1 c\u1ea3m-x\u00fac theo ph\u01b0\u01a1ng-ph\u00e1p l\u00e0 m\u1ed9t chuy\u1ec7n v\u00f4-c\u00f9ng v\u1ea5t v\u1ea3. V\u00e0 \u0111\u00e2y ch\u00ednh l\u00e0 \u0111i\u1ec1u \u201cK\u1ef3-b\u00ed\u201d nh\u01b0 Wittgenstein \u0111\u00e3 n\u00f3i: 6.45 \u2026Das Gef\u00fclht der Welt als begrenztes Granzes ist das myystische.\/\u0110\u00fang l\u00e0 K\u1ef3-b\u00ed khi ch\u00fang ta c\u1ea3m th\u1ea5y th\u1ebf-gian c\u00f3 nhi\u1ec1u h\u1eefu-h\u1ea1n.<\/i><\/p>\n
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Ph\u01b0\u01a1ng-ph\u00e1p h\u1ecdc c\u1ee7a Descartes, \u0111\u1eb7t n\u1eb7ng \u00fd-th\u1ee9c v\u1ec1 c\u00e1i t\u00f4i \u201cCogito ergo sum\u201d. Theo \u0111\u00fang v\u0103n-ph\u1ea1m Latin, c\u00e2u n\u00e0y ph\u1ea3i hi\u1ec3u l\u00e0: \u201cT\u00f4i \u0111ang suy-t\u01b0, cho n\u00ean t\u00f4i bi\u1ebft t\u00f4i hi\u1ec7n-h\u1eefu.\u201d Ti\u1ebfp theo \u0111\u00f3 \u00f4ng tr\u00ecnh-b\u00e0y S\u00e1u Suy-t\u01b0 v\u1ec1 \u00fd-th\u1ee9c b\u1eb1ng hai ph\u1ea7n g\u1ed3m c\u00f3: B\u1ea3y (7) Ph\u1ea3n-bi\u1ec7n\/Objections v\u00e0 B\u1ea3y (7) Tr\u1ea3-l\u1eddi\/Replies. Ng\u00e0y nay, ch\u00fang ta bi\u1ebft r\u00f5, \u00dd-th\u1ee9c trong ph\u01b0\u01a1ng-ph\u00e1p h\u1ecdc c\u1ee7a Descartes ho\u00e0n-to\u00e0n d\u1ef1a v\u00e0o \u00dd-th\u1ee9c n\u1ed9i-t\u1ea1i (Self-understanding), \u0111\u01b0\u1ee3c tr\u00ecnh b\u00e0y minh b\u1ea1ch trong tinh-th\u1ea7n Duy-l\u00fd (Reason), ch\u1ee9 kh\u00f4ng ph\u00e0i theo Lu\u1eadn-l\u00fd. Ch\u00ednh v\u00ec th\u1ebf Husserl \u0111\u00e3 \u0111\u1ebfn Paris l\u00e0m s\u00e1ng t\u1ecf \u00fd-ngh\u0129a v\u1ec1 c\u00e1i Th\u1ee9c trong Cogito c\u1ee7a Descartes. Kh\u00f4ng ph\u1ea3i ch\u1ec9 l\u00e0 t\u1ef1-th\u1ee9c c\u1ee7a C\u00e1i T\u00f4i, cho ri\u00eang t\u00f4i, m\u00e0 ph\u1ea3i bi\u1ebft \u0111\u1ebfn c\u00e1i T\u00f4i c\u1ee7a tha-nh\u00e2n, trong \u00fd-ngh\u0129a h\u1ed9i-th\u00f4ng nh\u00e2n-lo\u1ea1i, m\u1ed9t th\u1ee9c r\u1ea5t c\u0103n c\u01a1 sau khi \u0111\u00e3 th\u1ea5y t\u1ea5t c\u1ea3 nh\u1eefng \u0111i\u1ec1u kh\u00f4ng th\u1eadt g\u1ecdi l\u00e0 hi\u1ec7n-t\u01b0\u1ee3ng. <\/p>\n
Hi\u1ec7n-t\u01b0\u1ee3ng Lu\u1eadn c\u1ee7a Hegel v\u1ec1 th\u00e2n-ph\u1eadn thi\u1ebfu t\u1ef1-do c\u1ee7a con ng\u01b0\u1eddi l\u00e0 c\u00e1i nh\u00ecn s\u00e2u s\u1eafc v\u1ec1 hai tr\u01b0\u1eddng-h\u1ee3p: (1) Th\u00e2n-ph\u1eadn c\u00f4ng-b\u1ed9c (serf) v\u00e0 (2) Th\u00e2n-ph\u1eadn n\u00f4-l\u1ec7 (slave). \u1ede tr\u01b0\u1eddng-h\u1ee3p th\u1ee9 nh\u1ea5t vua ch\u00faa hay ch\u00ednh-th\u1ec3 \u0111\u1ed9c-t\u00e0i ban \u01a1n cho m\u1ed9t nh\u00f3m ng\u01b0\u1eddi \u0111\u1ec3 nh\u00f3m n\u00e0y ch\u1ecbu \u01a1n x\u1ea3 th\u00e2n tr\u00e2u ng\u1ef1a, nh\u01b0ng lu\u00f4n lu\u00f4n hoang-t\u01b0\u1edfng: \u201cR\u1eb1ng \u01a1n Th\u00e1nh-\u0111\u1ebf r\u1ed3i r\u00e0o!\u201d Th\u1ebf l\u00e0 h\u1ea1ng c\u00f4ng-b\u1ed9c cha truy\u1ec1n con n\u1ed1i. Ch\u00e1u ch\u1eaft h\u1ecd h\u00e0ng qu\u00ean r\u1eb1ng \u201cM\u00ecnh \u0111\u1ed9i qu\u1ea7n qu\u00e8!\u201d \u1ede tr\u01b0\u1eddng-h\u1ee3p th\u1ee9 hai con ng\u01b0\u1eddi n\u00f4-l\u1ec7 b\u1ecb t\u01b0\u1edbc b\u1ecf nh\u00e2n-t\u00ednh v\u00e0 b\u1ecb coi nh\u01b0 con v\u1eadt, t\u1ed1i ng\u00e0y \u0111\u00e0o s\u00e2u cu\u1ed1c b\u1eabm, d\u01b0\u1edbi quy\u1ec1n giai-c\u1ea5p c\u00f4ng-b\u1ed9c. Trong khi \u1ea5y, giai-c\u1ea5p l\u00e3nh-\u0111\u1ea1o kh\u00f4ng kh\u00e1c g\u00ec vua ch\u00faa t\u1ef1 h\u00e0o l\u00e0 \u201cTr\u1eabm th\u01b0\u01a1ng d\u00e2n nh\u01b0 th\u01b0\u01a1ng con!\u201d <\/p>\n
\u0110\u1ec3 lu\u1eadn v\u1ec1 \u00fd-th\u1ee9c theo tinh-th\u1ea7n khoa-h\u1ecdc th\u00ec ch\u00fang ta kh\u00f4ng th\u1ec3 qu\u00ean Spinoza v\u1ec1 ph\u01b0ong-ph\u00e1p lu\u1eadn c\u1ee7a \u00f4ng. Theo Spinoza, \u0111\u1ec3 c\u00f3 m\u1ed9t \u00fd-th\u1ee9c uy\u00ean-\u00e1o v\u1ec1 v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 A, th\u00ec tr\u01b0\u1edbc h\u1ebft, ch\u00fang ta ph\u1ea3i tr\u01b0ng ra nh\u1eefng l\u1ebd v\u1ec1 A, theo th\u1ee9-t\u1ef1 sau \u0111\u00e2y:<\/p>\n
1) Ph\u00e1t-\u0111oan lu\u1eadn (Premise\/Proposition), V\u00ed d\u1ee5: \u0110\u00e2y l\u00e0 A<\/p>\n
2) Tr\u00ecnh-b\u00e0y (Demonstration) th\u1eadt r\u00f5 lu\u1eadn-c\u01b0\u01a1ng A <\/p>\n
3) Ch\u1ee9ng-minh b\u1eb1ng gi\u1ea3-thi\u1ebft (Lemma) li\u00ean-quan t\u1edbi A<\/p>\n
4) D\u00f9ng t\u1ea5t c\u1ea3 nh\u1eefng \u0111i\u1ec3m li\u00ean-quan t\u1edbi v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 A (Scholium)<\/p>\n
5) K\u1ebft-lu\u1eadn (Corollary) d\u1ef1a tr\u00ean nh\u1eefng y\u1ebfu-t\u1ed1 k\u1ec3 tr\u00ean, t\u1ee9c l\u00e0 \u0111\u00fang hi\u1ebfn-nhi\u00ean (deductive)<\/p>\n
Cu\u1ed1i c\u00f9ng trong ph\u1ea7n k\u1ebft-lu\u1eadn c\u1ee7a Tractatus<\/i>, Wittgenstein tr\u00e1nh kh\u00f4ng \u0111\u1ee5ng \u0111\u1ebfn \u201cK\u1ef3-b\u00ed\u201d, \u00f4ng ch\u1ec9 khuy\u00ean r\u1eb1ng\u201d 7. Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, dar\u00fcber mu\u03b2 man schweigen\u03b2\/\u0110i\u1ec1u g\u00ec ch\u00fang ta kh\u00f4ng th\u1ec3 n\u00f3i ra, ch\u00fang ta ph\u1ea3i y\u00ean-l\u1eb7ng<\/i>.\u201d Tuy-nhi\u00ean \u201cy\u00ean-l\u1eb7ng\u201d c\u0169ng l\u00e0 m\u1ed9t \u00fd-th\u1ee9c. Nh\u01b0 th\u1ebf \u201cy\u00ean-l\u1eb7ng\u201d kh\u00f4ng c\u00f3 ngh\u0129a l\u00e0 gi\u1ea3i quy\u1ebft \u0111\u01b0\u1ee3c v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1. <\/p>\n
V. V\u1ea4N-\u0110\u1ec0 NG\u00d4N-NG\u1eee TRONG TRACTATUS<\/i><\/p>\n
Ph\u1ea7n b\u00e0n v\u1ec1 ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef trong Tractatus<\/i> c\u1ee7a Wittgenstein coi nh\u01b0 m\u1ed9t ch\u01b0\u01a1ng d\u00e0i nh\u1ea5t, t\u1eeb c\u00e2u 4.001 \u0111\u1ebfn c\u00e2u 4.53, c\u1ea3 th\u1ea9y 26 trang, <\/p>\n
Theo Wittgenstein, ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef l\u00e0 m\u1ed9t th\u1ef1c-th\u1ec3 (Wirklickeit)<\/i> v\u1edbi nh\u1eefng li\u00ean-h\u1ec7 g\u1eafn b\u00f3 ch\u1eb7t ch\u1ebd v\u1edbi nhau \u0111\u01b0\u1ee3c g\u1ecdi l\u00e0 m\u1ed9t th\u1ee9 \u201ctr\u00f2 ch\u01a1i\u201d c\u00f3 quy-t\u1eafc r\u00f5 r\u00e0ng nh\u01b0 sau n\u00e0y Wittgenstein b\u00e0n \u0111\u1ebfn trong t\u1eadp Philosophical Investigations<\/i>. Ngay t\u1ea1i \u0111\u00e2y \u00f4ng \u0111\u00e3 kh\u1eb3ng-\u0111\u1ecbnh nh\u01b0 sau.<\/p>\n
4.001. Th\u1ef1c th\u1ec3 c\u1ee7a m\u1ed9t m\u1ec7nh-\u0111\u1ec1 l\u00e0 v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef<\/i>. (Die Gesamtheit der S\u00e4tzs ist die Sprache<\/i>). Ngh\u0129a l\u00e0 c\u00f3 nh\u1eefng ph\u1ea7n li\u00ean-h\u1ec7 v\u00e0 b\u1ed5-t\u00fac cho nhau trong c\u00e2u n\u00f3i c\u0169ng nh\u01b0 c\u00e2u vi\u1ebft. Tuy nhi\u00ean, ch\u00fang ta n\u00ean \u0111\u1ec3 \u00fd \u0111\u1ebfn c\u00e2u 4.002 khi Wittgenstein tr\u01b0ng ra n\u0103m \u0111i\u1ec3m g\u1ecdi l\u00e0 b\u1ea3n-ch\u1ea5t hay th\u1ef1c-th\u1ec3 c\u1ee7a ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef nh\u01b0 sau. Theo \u00f4ng: <\/p>\n
1. Ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef c\u00f3 kh\u1ea3-n\u0103ng di\u1ec5n-t\u1ea3 m\u1ecdi \u00fd-ngh\u0129a (c\u1ea3m-th\u1ee9c \u2018sense\u2019 kh\u00e1c v\u1edbi ngh\u0129a \u2018meaning\u2019).<\/p>\n
2. Ch\u00fang ta n\u00f3i nh\u01b0ng ch\u00fang ta kh\u00f4ng r\u00f5 ngh\u0129a c\u1ee7a ch\u1eef.<\/p>\n
3. Ch\u00fang ta kh\u00f4ng c\u00f3 kh\u1ea3-n\u0103ng t\u1ea1o ra lu\u1eadn-l\u00fd tr\u01b0\u1edbc khi c\u00f3 ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef.<\/p>\n
4. Ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef kh\u00f4ng th\u1ea5y \u0111\u01b0\u1ee3c t\u00ednh v\u00e0 th\u1ec3 c\u1ee7a t\u01b0-t\u01b0\u1edfng,<\/p>\n
5. Hi\u1ec3u \u0111\u01b0\u1ee3c ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef d\u00f9ng h\u1eb1ng ng\u00e0y l\u00e0 m\u1ed9t v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 v\u00f4 c\u00f9ng ph\u1ee9c-t\u1ea1p,<\/p>\n
Nguy\u00ean-t\u00e1c ti\u1ebfng \u0110\u1ee9c [4.002 Der Menschh besittzt die F\u00e4higkeit Sprachen zu bauen,womit sich jeder Sinn ausdr\u00fccken ll\u00e4sst, ohne eine Ahnung dawon zu haben, wie und was jedes Wort bedeuner \u2013 Wie nub auch spritcht, ohne zu wiussen, wie die einzelnen Laureherforgebracht warden.<\/i><\/p>\n
Die Umgangssoache ist ein Teil des menschlichen Organismus und nicht weniger kompliziert als dieser,<\/i><\/p>\n
Es ist menschenunm\u00f6glich, die Sprachlogigik aus ihr unmittelbar zu entnehmen<\/i>.] <\/p>\n
M\u1ed9t b\u00e0i th\u01a1 cho ch\u00fang ta \u201cc\u1ea3m-th\u1ee9c\u201d v\u1ec1 m\u1ed9t ch\u1eef ch\u1ee9 kh\u00f4ng ph\u1ea3i v\u1ec1 ngh\u0129a. Th\u01a1, ngh\u1ec7-thu\u1eadt v\u00e0 t\u00e2m-l\u00fd g\u1ee3i ra c\u1ea3m-th\u1ee9c ch\u1ee9 kh\u00f4ng b\u00e0n v\u1ec1 ngh\u0129a. C\u1ea3m-th\u1ee9c cho ph\u00e9p ch\u00fang ta th\u1ea5y c\u00f3 chuy\u1ec7n v\u01b0\u1ee3t ra ngo\u00e0i \u0111\u1ed1i-tho\u1ea1i th\u00f4ng th\u01b0\u1eddng. C\u00e2u th\u1ee9 nh\u1ea5t c\u1ee7a Wittgenstein nghjch v\u1edbi b\u1ed1n c\u00e2u sau v\u00ec ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef kh\u00f4ng c\u00f3 kh\u1ea3 n\u0103ng di\u1ec5n-t\u1ea3 m\u1ecdi \u00fd-ngh\u0129a.<\/p>\n
Ch\u00fang ta ph\u1ea3i hi\u1ec3u th\u1ebf n\u00e0o v\u1ec1 nh\u1eadn-\u0111\u1ecbnh c\u1ee7a Wittgenstein: \u201cNh\u1eefng v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 s\u00e2u s\u1eafc nh\u1ea5t th\u1ef1c ra kh\u00f4ng ph\u1ea3i l\u00e0 v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1<\/i>\u201d.<\/p>\n
T\u00f4i \u0111\u1eb7t v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 v\u00e0 \u0111\u1ec1 ngh\u1ecb m\u1ea5y \u0111i\u1ec3m sau \u0111\u00e2y:<\/p>\n
1. Th\u1ebf n\u00e0o l\u00e0 v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 s\u00e2u-s\u1eafc nh\u1ea5t v\u00e0 t\u1ea1i sao v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 s\u00e2u s\u1eafc nh\u1ea5t kh\u00f4ng ph\u1ea3i l\u00e0 v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1? C\u00f3 l\u1ebd theo \u00f4ng v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 s\u00e2u s\u1eafc nh\u1ea5t v\u01b0\u1ee3t ra ngo\u00e0i tr\u00ed-tu\u1ec7 v\u00e0 \u00fd-th\u1ee9c c\u1ee7a ch\u00fang ta? <\/p>\n
2. C\u00f3 th\u1ec3 l\u00e0 Wittgenstein ch\u1ec9 quan-t\u00e2m \u0111\u1ebfn v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 \u0111\u01a1n-gi\u1ea3n. Nh\u01b0ng kh\u00f4ng ph\u1ea3i ch\u1ec9 c\u00f3 v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 \u0111\u01a1n-gi\u1ea3n m\u1edbi l\u00e0 v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 c\u1ee7a ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef. <\/p>\n
3. X\u00e9t theo lu\u1eadn-l\u00fd, ch\u00fang ta c\u00f3 ba th\u1ec3 so s\u00e1nh; t\u01b0\u01a1ng-\u0111\u1ed1i, so s\u00e1nh h\u01a1n k\u00e9m v\u00e0 \u0111\u1ec9nh cao kh\u00f4ng th\u1ec3 so-s\u00e1nh \u0111\u01b0\u1ee3c. V\u1eady th\u00ec ch\u00fang ta c\u00f3 th\u1ec3 l\u00e0m ng\u01a1 tr\u01b0\u1edbc v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 gay c\u1ea5n nh\u1ea5t kh\u00f4ng? <\/p>\n
4. B\u1ea3n-ch\u1ea5t c\u1ee7a ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef kh\u00f4ng gi\u1ea3n-d\u1ecb cho n\u00ean ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef h\u1eb1ng ng\u00e0y c\u0169ng kh\u00f4ng lu\u00f4n lu\u00f4n gi\u1ea3n-d\u1ecb. <\/p>\n
5. C\u00f3 th\u1ec3 \u00fd c\u1ee7a Wittgenstein lu\u1eadn r\u1eb1ng c\u00e1i g\u00ec g\u1ecdi l\u00e0 s\u00e2u-s\u1eafc nh\u1ea5t l\u00e0 c\u00e1i con ng\u01b0\u1eddi kh\u00f4ng \u0111\u1ee7 kh\u1ea3-n\u0103ng th\u1ea9m-\u0111\u1ecbnh gi\u00e1-tr\u1ecb. N\u1ebfu \u0111\u00fang th\u1ebf t\u1ea1i sao \u00f4ng l\u1ea1i b\u1ea3o \u201ckh\u00f4ng c\u00f3 v\u1ea5n-d\u1ec1\u201d, thay v\u00ec n\u00f3i \u201ckh\u00f4ng n\u00ean \u0111\u1eb7t v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1 v\u1ec1 c\u00e1i \u201cs\u00e2u s\u1eafc nh\u1ea5t\u201d..<\/p>\n
\u0110\u1ec3 tr\u00e1nh chuy\u1ec7n m\u1eadp m\u1edd trong ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef, Wittgenstein khuy\u00ean ch\u00fang ta n\u00ean d\u00f9ng lu\u1eadn-l\u00fd trong ng\u00f4n-ng\u1eef, t\u1ee9c l\u00e0 d\u00f9ng lu\u1eadn-l\u00fd c\u1ee7a v\u0103n-ph\u1ea1m c\u00f2n g\u1ecdi l\u00e0 c\u1ea5u-tr\u00fac lu\u1eadn-l\u00fd v\u1ec1 v\u1ecb-tr\u00ed c\u1ee7a t\u1eebng ch\u1eef trong c\u00e2u (logical syntax, trong c\u00e2u 3325). \u0110\u00e2y c\u0169ng l\u00e0 ph\u01b0\u01a1ng-ph\u00e1p c\u1ee7a Occam \u0111\u1ec3 l\u00e0m s\u00e1ng-t\u1ecf t\u01b0-duy. Xin xem c\u00e2u 3328. <\/p>\n
Tuy nhi\u00ean, l\u00fd-lu\u1eadn v\u1ec1 \u00fd-ngh\u0129a (logical semantic) trong c\u00e2u m\u1edbi ch\u00ednh l\u00e0 \u0111\u1eddi s\u1ed1ng b\u1edfi v\u00ec c\u00f3 tr\u01b0\u1eddng-h\u01a1p \u00fd hay ch\u1eef b\u1ea5t ng\u1edd v\u00e0 quan-tr\u1ecdng tham d\u1ef1 v\u00e0o \u0111\u1ec3 l\u00e0m cho m\u1ec7nh-\u0111\u1ec1 ch\u1eafc v\u00e0 tr\u1ecdn-v\u1eb9n. M\u1ed9t m\u1ec7nh-\u0111\u1ec1 th\u01b0\u1eddng c\u00f3 k\u00fd-hi\u1ec7u v\u00e0 bi\u1ec3u-t\u01b0\u1ee3ng (sign v\u00e0 symbol). Tuy r\u1eb1ng ch\u00fang c\u00f3 n\u1ed9i-dung kh\u00e1c nhau nh\u01b0ng c\u00f3 th\u1ec3 thay th\u1ebf cho nhau n\u1ebfu h\u1ee3p-l\u00fd. Th\u01b0\u1eddng th\u00ec Bi\u1ec3u-t\u01b0\u1ee3ng (symbol) c\u00f3 l\u1ecbch-s\u1eed v\u00e0 \u00fd-ngh\u0129a trong khi \u0111\u00f3 k\u00fd-hi\u1ec7u ch\u1ec9 c\u00f3 t\u00ednh t\u1ef1-\u0111\u1ecbnh. Do \u0111\u00f3 bi\u1ec3u-t\u01b0\u1ee3ng v\u00e0 k\u00fd-hi\u1ec7u kh\u00f4ng th\u1ec3 thay th\u1ebf cho nhau. Khi ngh\u0129a c\u1ee7a k\u00fd-hi\u1ec7u (sign) trong c\u01a1-c\u1ea5u v\u0103n-ph\u1ea1m r\u00f5 r\u00e0ng th\u00ec k\u00fd-hi\u1ec7u \u0111\u00f3 tr\u1edf th\u00e0nh bi\u1ec3u-t\u01b0\u1ee3ng (symbol).<\/p>\n
Khi m\u1ecdi th\u00e0nh-ph\u1ea7n k\u1ec3 c\u1ea3 \u1ea9n-d\u1ee5 (metaphor) trong c\u00e2u li\u00ean-k\u1ebft ch\u1eb7t ch\u1ebd v\u1edbi nhau, th\u00ec c\u00e2u \u0111\u00f3 s\u00e1ng-s\u1ee7a v\u1ec1 c\u1ea3 hai m\u1eb7t c\u01a1-c\u1ea5u v\u0103n-ph\u1ea1m (syntax) v\u00e0 ngh\u0129a l\u00fd (semantic), do \u0111\u00f3 c\u00e2u \u1ea5y l\u00e0 m\u1ed9t t\u01b0-t\u01b0\u1edfng v\u1eefng-v\u00e0ng. <\/p>\n
(C\u00f2n ti\u1ebfp)
<\/p>\n
THE ONTOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS<\/p>\n
Continued from the Second Part<\/p>\n
IV. GLORY AND PARADOX<\/p>\n
To entertain German readers<\/b> and all those who are interested in the original text, I would like to copy the original propositions 6.44, 6.45 and 6.522 in Wittgenstein\u2019s Tractatus<\/i>:<\/p>\n
6.44 Nicht wie die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern da<\/i>\u03b2 sie ist.<\/i><\/i><\/p>\n
The English version of Pears and McGuiness clarifies Wittgenstein\u2019s text by adding the word \u201cthings\u201d to connect proposition 6.44 to the previous ones while my reading is simply that:<\/p>\n
The world is not just what it is; there is the mystic as well.<\/i><\/i><\/p>\n
6.45 Die Anschauung der Welt sub specie aeterni ist ihre Anschauung als —begrenztes —Ganzes.<\/i><\/i><\/p>\n
Das Gef<\/i>\u00fc<\/i>hl der Welt als begrenztes Ganzes ist das mystische<\/i>.<\/p>\n
The word aeterni<\/i> may cause trouble for English readers, especially for those of whom the English language is not their mother tongue; this problem even challenges those who do not have a foundation in philosophy. The word aeterni<\/i> (eternity) is a Latin noun whose singular form reads aeternus<\/i>, meaning, an attribute to God, also denoting the quality of showing. To say \u201csub specie aeterni<\/i>\u201d would mean \u201clesser eternal being<\/i>\u201d for arts, aesthetics, ethics and mathematics following Wittgenstein\u2019s definition in his Notebook (Black, 1964, pp). It also means something already at the beginning. Rhetorically, the expression \u201csub specie<\/i> aeterni<\/i>\u201d seems only intelligible in thought. Thus, to say showing the world as a less eternal thing means to describe the world as limited in totality. That Wittgenstein speculates on \u201csub specie aeterni\u201d means it impresses on his mind, an idea of some sort of \u201ctotality\u201d existing only as a mystical thing. In fact, for us, the phrase \u201csub specie aeterni<\/i>\u201d must be supported by shown experiences. That the whole of the world is limited against eternity would also mean such a limitation is in fact eternal, that the world is a forever limited totality, something above our heads and above episteme. Yet, we cannot deny that it irks our mind to frustration \u2014 and that is the reason for Wittgenstein to believe it is mystical.<\/p>\n
6.522 Es gibt allerdings Unausssprechliches. Die zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische.<\/i><\/i><\/p>\n
My translation runs as<\/p>\n
The mystical is something that cannot be put in words but only by its showing<\/i>.<\/p>\n
What kind of \u201cmystical thing\u201d does Wittgenstein really want to discuss? Certainly theological concepts do not interest him, but for him as well as for us some other unknown thing might have tricked human imagination to believe there is something called the \u201csupernatural\u201d, the gist of religious faith. Is this what we should call \u201cthe mystical\u201d? Once on the train with his Italian friend, a bird\u2019s song suddenly caught Wittgenstein\u2019s attention, and so he said to his friend: \u201cThere must be logic in that bird\u2019s song.\u201d His friend made a hand gesture, known to Italian people as something nonsense, to respond to Wittgenstein\u2019s unworthy remark. The bird\u2019s song and the logic are two different entities. How did he know they were correlated? He would have surmised that they were, and although his interpretation was intelligible, we might guess, it only functioned in rhetoric and not on a cognitive level. What does this anecdote say about the mystical? In essence, the \u201cmystical\u201d as a phenomenon only makes sense by \u201cshowings\u201d supported by anecdotes, not by way of explanations. This could quiet Russell\u2019s mind.<\/p>\n
While in response to Wittgenstein\u2019s consciousness of something called \u201cthe mystical\u201d we might have an array of questions about the mystical ourselves as we begin to question our experiences on mystical things. Is God the mystical Being? Wittgenstein said God never manifests himself in the world. Clearly, he dismissed any belief that God ever exists as the \u201cmystical\u201d. So, from Wittgenstein\u2019s view, would Bernini\u2019s sculpture of the Ecstasy of St. Theresa <\/i>represents a hallucination of the subject, or would it be about the subject\u2019s experience called the mystical? Wittgenstein\u2019s consciousness clearly reflects his positivist background. However, when he touches on subjects like \u201cthe mystical\u201d, he is drawn into metaphysical mind that carries him away from scientific certainty.<\/p>\n
Would Wittgenstein\u2019s comment of the \u201caccidental\u201d be connected to \u201cthe mystical\u201d? He said that in logic there is nothing \u201caccidental\u201d. It is only true in logic. <\/p>\n
2,012 In der Logik ist nichts zuf<\/i>\u00e4<\/i>llig: Wenn das Ding im Sachverhaltvorkommen kann, so mu<\/i>\u03b2 <\/i>die M<\/i>\u00f6<\/i>rglichkeit des Sachverhaltes im Ding bereits pr<\/i>\u00e4<\/i>judiziert sein.<\/i><\/i><\/p>\n
2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself.<\/i><\/i><\/p>\n
Logic is the art of argument based on propositions analyzable by logical language. Logic cannot deal with the complex content and context of a subject in which overlapped variables, some put, others open, necessarily exist for interrelated sources. Furthermore, this sudden multiplicity builds up complex levels of contextualization. This challenges investigation, especially of the unknown. And this is not the job of logic at all.<\/p>\n
Not only is it true that consciousness as a priori<\/i> activity of our mind only deals with reality in a narrow sense, it absorbs the fact and manifests it regarding all possible confronting issues that requires our attention and analysis. There is consciousness of variety as well as particularity, or example educational consciousness, historical consciousness and philosophical consciousness to mention a few modes of consciousness (Heidegger, 1988, p. 27). It also concerns the definition of the nature of ontology, classical and modern, bringing them all to light as the givens to be treated in the present. Heidegger\u2019s concept of the present as what is at our hand because of all of its truth is urgent, immediate or even arbitrary.<\/p>\n
The first quarter of the Twentieth Century witnessed new methods of criticism and investigation into the fact. Among which philosophical Hermeneutics dealt with unalterable and inexplicable fact called \u201cFacticity\u201d. As early as 1923 Heidegger\u2019s lectures on Facticity at the University of Marburg contributed one important volume titled Hermeneutics of Facticity<\/i> (1988), in which Heidegger argued that Hermeneutical theory as a strong method encompassing crucial points to grasp the nature of man containing engaging, approaching, accessing, interrogating and explicating. In fact, his lectures on Hermeneutics are preparatory notes for his major work Being and Time<\/i> (Sein und Zeit<\/i>), namely on the concept of existence (Sein) and existence-there (Dasein), minus the notion of time. In brief, Hermeneutics explicated the nature of man (human being) by pointing out man\u2019s object or Facticity; namely the immediate present of man\u2019s life. He drew the evidences from the case of Kierkegaard and Van Gogh. However he cautioned that these two cases only dealt with personal consciousness rather than Hermeneutics of Facticity. 7<\/sup><\/p>\n Heidegger wrote the introduction to his book Ontology<\/i> –The Hermeneutics of Facticity<\/i>, in which he made it clear that the word \u201cOntology\u201d as the principal element of the book\u2019s title above should have been removed because it was vague. He argued, as a new doctrine of consciousness the idea of Hermeneutics is different from the classical one. Heidegger strongly recommends us to consider Hermeneutics as a method to critique different unknown domains generally about the things or tributes to humanity, particularly dealing with the power of human soul. The subject of the soul is primordially and immensely attracts the mind of Continental philosophers, such as Hegel, Heidegger and Gadamer for whom the soul devoid of theological contexts is related to existential being<\/i> (Seien<\/i>), having no accord with theological and metaphysical doctrine at all speaking in terms of modern sense of the concept of the soul, which must be related to being at hand.<\/p>\n To be clear, Hermeneutics is a method of investigation of the truth beginning with reflection. It means reflection on the truth in every single subject for genuine consciousness be clarified. Exactly it begins with the problem of consciousness. By way of reflection, Hermeneutics returns to the pre-consciousness. Thus, Hermeneutical reflection looks for all clues in history making up present reality. Gadamer points out the implicit case that goes against Christian theology by Bultmann\u2019s concept of demythologizing or Enlightenment contrast to theological standpoint without a check of history (Gadamer, 1977, 52). Gadamer agrees with Bultmann such a theology has no historical background except mysticism, once it is believed that at the beginning Christianity was but a cult. This relates to the true but provokes the Church and her followers. We also need to pay attention to the eminent subject of the soul in Continental and Oriental culture that has no historical background in terms of Fact and Facticity, save it is a belief. However, in Continental thought the soul appears as a philosophical point parallel to the mind, most evident in the philosophy of Descartes in his section on Arguments that he tried to distinguish between soul and body. In fact, this whole section devotes to \u201cmind (thinking) and body\u201d instead of soul and body. These two opponents exist apart from each other. Spinoza in his attempt to write on (or to clarify) Descartes thought also concentrates on the characteristics of mind and body quieting on the word \u201csoul\u201d itself and thus making no connection of mind ever to theology at all. We have already contoured this subject in the preceding paragraphs. <\/p>\n Verily, the word soul has never been in the spotlight of British and American philosophy. This is typically clear in the case of Santayana (The sense of Beauty<\/i>). He only accepted the word \u201csoul\u201d as an equivalent to \u201cessence\u201d and to him the concept of God is a mere metaphor. For him, in his early philosophical career, the beauty and the beautiful in arts are just for entertaining. Likewise if we try to grasp the meaning of the soul we would see that it is an extremely difficult thing, if not baseless one for grasping and for elaborating in philosophical discourse as well as in life. Therefore, the problems on the<\/i> eternal<\/i> and the my<\/i>stical<\/i> in Wittgenstein\u2019s Tractatus <\/i>would be just the mode of feeling and we<\/i> cannot be certain if fact<\/i> and faticity<\/i> could be employed to decipher Wittgenstein\u2019s accidental remark on the eternal<\/i> and the mystical<\/i>, simply in the absence of evidences to support his claim.<\/p>\n What do we think about some images in religious dogmas? For example can we be sure of our knowledge of the image of the Buddha and Jesus Christ; namely what do they look like? They are the products of feeling and awe-inspiring rather than by sheer knowledge. Their images are \u201coff the wall concept\u201d impresses religious church goers that Jesus is vindicated as the only Son of God, and Buddha the Compassionate. How do the face of the Son of God and that of his mother Mary the Virgin bear the Italian traits? And how have such images become some sort of sub specie<\/i> eternal<\/i> and mystical<\/i> to their adherents? Surely, such images are not universal, even not public in terms of \u201cpublicness\u201d according to the concept of Husserlian phenomenology as well as of Hermeneutics. Yet, in terms of theological doctrine, for instance Calvinism, human beings make themselves in the image of God, which is a belief of traditional Hermeneutics, but which is provocative as well as non-scientific in contemporary mind. How do human beings know the Face of God, even Moses only saw God\u2019s back. Without having evidence of the Face of God how could human beings make themselves in the image of God? Even it is harder for human beings to emulate God\u2019s ethics. In fact, these images have been in history and historicity for some thousands of years despite criticism arising from fact and Facticity if we have ever questioned about the everlasting being of such images. Religious dogmas are not true consciousness in modern philosophy because, generally speaking, it contemplates on self-understanding.<\/p>\n The consciousness of knowledge of God in the philosophy of Descartes (Meditation III, pp. 81-89) 10<\/sup> asserts God\u2019s existence as the infinite while everything else including humans as the finite. God does not only truly exist but also has power to conserve all beings in heaven. For Descartes, the word \u201cheaven\u201d substitutes for the word \u201cuniverse\u201d that comes from God\u2019s creation. As such in his corollary drawn from the preceding principles, he concludes that God is the One or the only Substance and so God is Infinite or simply put, Descartes reasons that from the stand point of the finite of human being, God is the sole Creator. In that sense, there is absolutely no Hermeneutical reflection on God\u2019s beginning and history. As such, God creates the entire universe, not just the earth planet on which all beings are finite so they contemplate the infinite or God. The attempt to search for the existence and the substance of God remains open to the future of science. If science discovers the substance of God it would not make human being happier for human being would face self-alienation or emptiness (the feeling) as assumed by the late famous British theoretical physicist, Stephen Hawking.<\/p>\n For Spinoza, God is the substance and also the source of Ethics (Ethics, pp. 355 -372) 11<\/sup><\/p>\n For Heidegger, these two modes, fact<\/i> and facticity<\/i> exist as a priori<\/i> in human life so that Heidegger reasons that Hermeneutical experiences are not just about personal experiences or about the ego. They are, in reality, must be existing being facing itself \u201cright there\u201d (Dasein), awakening our consciousness of the truth, even the one in history that exhibits itself in the mode of inexpressible fac<\/i>t versus the mode of Facticity<\/i>.<\/p>\n We will return to this subject after we thoroughly finish the claims of Wittgenstein called an act of authority versus freedom, in his Tractatu<\/i>s. For some Wittgenstein\u2019s thought or style of expression in the Tractatus<\/i> is tyrannical; namely it is given. In part it is due to his aphoristic writing, terse and eager commanding, and in part it is due to his overly assertive mood. The exchange between Karl Popper and him over the problem of philosophy, though not quite clear about the content to us, unveils his preference of authority, if not harassing, when he challenged Popper on the problem of morality. In fact, we even do not know how did Karl Popper respond to Wittgenstein, especially about problems of moral philosophy?<\/p>\n In fact, moral philosophy is a subject on human equality, a sort of unwritten constitution about what is right or wrong among social members. It asserts human freedom unless there are false and empty moral points. Alienation of other\u2019s voice of quality in life as well as disrespect to other\u2019s thought for fair exchange, especially in professional milieu, should be avoided. All different well put voices deserve serious attention and cannot be judged on the basis of prejudices on personality, ethnicity, culture, education and social status. Authority initiated by totalitarian system is clearly immoral and violation of human rights. In such a system the moral codes are falsely invented (mandated) to the interests of the ruling class whose voice is similar to God\u2019s and whose ruling (executive and judiciary) underlies its immanence and therefore it is without contest.<\/p>\n Hermeneutical research and investigation of truth, according to Gadamer clarifies inescapable points left behind by Heidegger. Essentially, it should rework on the problem of reflection to determine if there is prejudice and alienation prior to making judgment according to which even the process of sciences should also be challenged. This point is absent in Wittgenstein\u2019s early philosophy (the Tractatus<\/i>). This point also challenges Heidegger\u2019s concept of being in language. For Gadamer the consciousness of being, for example the being in language is untouched in Heidegger\u2019s Being and Time<\/i>. <\/p>\n At the onset of my book, I have already highlighted the modes of consciousness, not yet in depth, prior to true understanding. But then I have also not warned against myself about self-understanding and complete understanding. Here is how we should do. To the point, I recommend the reading of Gadamer\u2019s lecture On the Problem of Self-Understanding<\/i> in regard of the history of the \u201cmyth\u201d and the \u201clogos\u201d. If the issue of the \u201cmyth\u201d exists in everything concerning the finite and the infinite, then the quest of the Scripture coming out the myth requires great investigations. God\u2019s Word reflecting God, or the Word is but God, comes into being in the form of Scripture or Logos, which is the power of manifested by human mind. <\/p>\n The theme on the Logos (Thought) excites man\u2019s mind for Wittgenstein to muse on \u201cmyth\u201d or the \u201cmystical\u201d, which he proclaims but not follow, either by philosophical hermeneutics or positivist method. This problem even gives us some trouble with Gadamer who tries to show that the consciousness reflecting knowledge necessarily leading to the claim of truth, we have patiently follow his expos\u00e9 but we have missed him at his expository style, more about rationality than about explicit evidence. <\/p>\n Although the seventeenth century heralded the scientific method for preliminary effort to modern philosophy about true consciousness, neither Descartes nor Spinoza went beyond self-understanding. The twentieth century philosophers like Gadamer stresses on historical reflection using theological truth as indisputable instance. He shows the evolution from the unknown or the myth to the Logos or human thought. In fact, this method of demystification supporting the myth as the truth evidently for the defense of Scripture in whose very essence there is nothing but the Word, an attribute to God. That is the central point of Gadamer\u2019s lecture. And metaphorically speaking while we read his lecture on the Word we patiently wait and only turn our face skyward where we are engulfed in nothingness, or nothing about Enlightenment. Simply put, we are not convinced.<\/p>\n V. THE QUESTION OF LANGUAGE IN THE TRACTATUS<\/i><\/p>\n This section on language covers the largest so-called chapter of the Tractatus<\/i>, roughly from proposition 4.001 through 4.53 with some related problems touching on auxiliary issues all totaling about 26 pages. And this is truly the main corpus of Wittgenstein\u2019s philosophy of language.<\/p>\n For Wittgenstein, the idea of Wirklickeit<\/i> or reality in language represents the operative connection of the parts of speech that was later called \u201cthe language game\u201d well discussed in Philosophical Investigations<\/i>. He asserts the reality of language as follows<\/p>\n 4.001. The reality of propositions is language. (Die Gesamtheit der S\u00e4tzs ist die Sprache<\/i>). This means the parts of speech in writing and speaking are actually about language. However, in remark 4.002, Wittgenstein presents five points about the nature or reality of language.<\/p>\n 1) Language is capable of expressing every sense.<\/p>\n 2) The speaker does not know \u201chow each word has meaning\u201d.<\/p>\n 3) We are not capable to create logic before language.<\/p>\n 4) Language cannot see the form and essence of thought. <\/p>\n 5) Understanding of everyday language is \u201cenormously complicated\u201d.<\/p>\n The original reads as[4.002 Der Menschh besittzt die F\u00e4higkeit Sprachen zu bauen,womit sich jeder Sinn ausdr\u00fccken ll\u00e4sst, ohne eine Ahnung dawon zu haben, wie und was jedes Wort bedeuner \u2013 Wie nub auch spritcht, ohne zu wiussen, wie die einzelnen Laureherforgebracht warden.<\/i><\/p>\n Die Umgangssoache ist ein Teil des menschlichen Organismus und nicht weniger kompliziert als dieser,<\/i><\/p>\n Es ist menschenunm\u00f6glich, die Sprachlogigik aus ihr unmittelbar zu entnehmen<\/i>.] <\/p>\n Of the five points paraphrased in my text, number one and number two contradict each other, and so it contradicts all the rest of his claims. If language is capable of \u201cexpressing every sense\u201d then while speaking man does not know \u201chow each word has meaning\u201d. This is what Wittgenstein means there is no co-ordination between \u201cthought\u201d and \u201cword\u201d. As a result, is this true that man always talks nonsense? In reality, man uses word similarly to a game playing that is conventionally constituted, although in retrospection man realizes that there are some cases that his choice of word does not carry his message correctly. Or in some case man uses word without live experience, never been familiar with, or only heard of, for example \u201crecursive\u201d (adj.) an expression giving successive terms of a series in mathematics, or \u201cSappho\u201d (The Greek poetess, in 600 B.C.E, author of Lesbos<\/i>; hence lesbian, woman homosexuality). Or even a newly invented word like \u201cinstagram\u201d for public sharing of videos and photos information. Man may use such terms arbitrary without knowing their specific meanings, their reality or their radical. In this case misuse of word is normal and unveils man\u2019s ignorance that is not always detected or questioned in everyday dialogue. We may conclude, following point five of Wittgenstein, that daily communications are \u201cenormously complicated.\u201d <\/p>\n The contradiction between number 1 and number 4 is clearer. The latter holds language cannot see the form and essence of thought. This is true but how Wittgenstein holds that language can express every sense. Does the word \u201csense\u201d have no relation to thought and thinking? Yet, word cannot capture the form and essence of thought faithfully; it points to thought as an inquisitiveness suggesting a research on which paradigm may reveal. This small paragraph is an example. Exception is in the case of sciences and mathematics word is unable to capture their forms and essences therefore man must have a solid background dealing with different levels of mathematic and scientific discipline plus intuition. In reality, there are limits or even off-limit to people outside such fields. <\/p>\n The word \u201csense\u201d in poetry, arts and psychology is no less complicated. It is open to unlimited interpretations for cases that go beyond convention or daily conversations (number five) to successfully capture the form and essence of the issues in question. If a proposition is found \u201cnonsensical\u201d as is in 4.003, in philosophical text, which means it has a problem of logic of language. Does this also mean a grammatical problem, too?<\/p>\n How do we understand Wittgenstein\u2019s claim that \u201cThe deepest problems are in fact not problems at all.\u201d<\/i> Does this mean the word \u201cdeepest\u201d is similar to \u201cunfathomable\u201d? Let us turn this problem to the Word of God.<\/p>\n Since God is the infinite Creator, and everything else in the universe including human being is finite, God\u2019s Word cannot be detected by human thought, either by speaking or by writing. How does man dare to proclaim the meaning of God\u2019s Word? To do this some human being must be equal to God in order to present the dialogue between God and man. Any sort of holly text is the product of faith that cannot be contested because such a text is the particular not the universal. How do we understand Wittgenstein\u2019s claim that \u201cThe deepest problems are in fact not problems at all\u201d<\/i>. It would mean we are unable grab them or does it mean they do not exist? As such, God\u2019s Word does not exist or God\u2019s language is off-limited. So the search of God\u2019s Word frustrates our mind and wastes our time. It is true that God does not speak human language. We simply picture God in human language, portraying God n the image of a big Daddy and wrongly call God by masculine gender; Him!<\/p>\n Modern cosmology is silent about what created universe, so staying away from all different concepts of myth about the existence of God. Instead for some decades in the twenty first century the age of the universe has been increasingly calcuted, up to about 13.8 billions of years as the universe continues to expand about 60 kilometers per second, according to Popular Sciences Report on January 13, 2921. This is a big challenge to any claims of God\u2019s language.<\/p>\n If God\u2019s language is prevalent, then man would detect the logic of God\u2019s language. At this point it is clear that man\u2019s mind projects everything from his own \u201cself-understanding\u201d, not his life experience. Self-understanding may easily end up becoming hallucination. Therefore, Scripture is a sort of \u201cplacebo\u201d to hold man up from seeing the nightmare of falling into abyss. A placebo cannot cure any kind of sickness because it is psychological make-believe or emotional pacifier.<\/p>\n Thought and language have their own different forms that are so complicated in ordinary language following convention or game rule. And it does not only occur in everyday language it occurs in philosopher\u2019s writings as well. Wittgenstein sees this problem being the lack of logic. Probably it could save Popper\u2019s time if he showed this problem to Wittgenstein as a specific point of problem in philosophy responding Wittgenstein\u2019s question. In fact, problem in philosophy is already pointed out in Wittgenstein\u2019s Tractatus<\/i>, for example: 3324 \u2026The most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole philosophy is full of them).<\/i><\/p>\n Instead of showing some specific problem of logic in philosophical works, Wittgenstein unexpectedly changes subject to the good and the beautiful, a metaphor of the tough choice causing confusion of expression. He provides no specific case in history where philosophical writings lack logic. I would like to paraphrase his points and add to such problems my own observation.<\/p>\n 6. It seems for Wittgenstein some problem in philosophical writings disclose the conflict of thought and logic. <\/p>\n 7. In such a case the problem of \u201cnonsense\u201d and \u201cfalsity\u201d are not clearly demonstrated. <\/p>\n 8. But he does not see in some case \u201cnonsense\u201d and \u201cfalsity\u201d are connected because they are interrelated, like cause and effect, for example, the Chinese believes that the moon being a palace where the angles dance is for us \u201cfalse\u201d and \u201cnonsensical\u201d. <\/p>\n 9. Here is the problem of Wittgenstein\u2019s aphoristic expression on \u201cnonsense\u201d and \u201cfalsity\u201d. While he tacitly cautions that philosophers must be clear that the \u201cgood\u201d and the \u201cbeautiful\u201d are two different issues that must be treated separately, He should also be clear that the latter concerns sensation, the former ethics. <\/p>\n 10. However, when he says the deepest problems are in fact no problems at all. [4.003] he does neither support his claim above nor providing examples. Probably he means such problems must be avoided as in 7. Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, dar\u00fcber mu\u03b2 man schweigen<\/i>; namely philosopher should avoid incomprehensibleness of issue. <\/p>\n 11. How deepest a problem is and how is it considered \u201cno problem\u201d? Would he mean such a problem is so deep to man\u2019s mind and consciousness? <\/p>\n 12. It would mean that Wittgenstein only prefers working on simple subject matter. It is fine but it is not all about language. <\/p>\n 13. As the matter of logic is concerned, the degree of relative, comparative, and superlative, only exists in specific measure. It is impossible to pinpoint the deepest or superlative degree at al. As such can we ignore the toughest and untouchable issue? Is humanity a toughest or deepest problem?<\/p>\n 14. Although the ontology of language is not simple, daily language is not always simple as well. <\/p>\n 15. Probably, for him there is nothing called \u201cthe deepest\u201d because it is an inconceivable subject matter for man\u2019s evaluation?<\/p>\n To evaporate such confusions, Wittgenstein suggests the use of linguistic logic, which means .using logical grammar or logical syntax. (3325) Following syntactical rule means getting the meaning of language symbol that is easy for man, according to Wittgenstein, to demonstrate the clarity of thought, also this is in the very sense of Occam\u2019s logical tenet quoted by Wittgenstein (3.328). <\/p>\n Yet, to demonstrate a proposition by using logical syntax, it is always sharp and clear to discriminate linguistic form, in which similar signs are in fact not the same due to their different content. However, logical semantic would show its existence in a proposition if accidentally its claim makes sense to secure propositional integrity. It is quite easy to use sign replacing symbol provided sign and symbol are interchangeable. In fact, while symbol has meaning and history, sign does not. Therefore, they cannot be a substitution for each other, for example the American flag.<\/p>\n Once the meaning of a sign in logical syntax is clear, that sign becomes a symbol. <\/p>\n Consider this statement:<\/p>\n President Trump claims that the election is fraud. The Electoral College\u2019s investigation agreeing with the court\u2019s outcomes all clear this charge. So President Trump has met his Waterloo<\/i>.<\/p>\n We do not have sign for Waterloo, but symbol, which means the critical defeat.<\/p>\n All parts of speech of this statement work and support each other as well as the metaphor (symbol). Once, the statement is semantically and syntactically good the thought stands firmly unquestionably. <\/p>\n (To be continued)<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \u00dd-th\u1ee9c l\u00e0 ho\u1ea1t-\u0111\u1ed9ng t\u1ef1-nhi\u00ean c\u1ee7a tr\u00ed-tu\u00ea, nh\u01b0 khi ch\u00fang ta \u0111\u1eb7t c\u00e2u h\u1ecfi v\u1ec1 Th\u01b0\u1ee3ng-\u0111\u1ebf hay T\u1ea1o-h\u00f3a, t\u1ee9c l\u00e0 \u0111\u1ee5ng v\u00e0o B\u1ea3n-th\u1ec3 v\u00f4-bi\u00ean. Nh\u01b0ng suy ra t\u1eeb \u0111o\u1ea1n m\u1edf-\u0111\u1ea7u c\u1ee7a chuy\u00ean lu\u1eadn n\u00e0y, \u00fd-th\u1ee9c l\u00e0 th\u1ee9c v\u1ec1 m\u1ecdi v\u1ea5n-\u0111\u1ec1, ngay c\u1ea3 \u00fd-th\u1ee9c v\u1ec1 th\u1ebf-gian h\u1eefu-h\u1ea1n, v\u1ec1 con ng\u01b0\u1eddi, v\u1ec1 v\u1ea1n-v\u1eadt, v\u1ec1 l\u1ecbch-s\u1eed, v\u1ec1 ch\u00ednh-tr\u1ecb v\u00e0 v\u1ec1 x\u00e3-h\u1ed9i\u2026\u00dd-th\u1ee9c kh\u00f4ng bao gi\u1edd to\u00e0n-v\u1eb9n, ngay c\u1ea3 nh\u1eefng chuy\u1ec7n nh\u1ecf b\u00e9 h\u1eb1ng ng\u00e0y nh\u01b0, c\u00e1i b\u00ecnh-\u0111\u00ee\u1ec7n xe h\u01a1i n\u00e0y l\u00e0m \u1edf \u0111\u00e2u, c\u00f3 b\u1ea3o-\u0111\u1ea3m \u0111\u00fang h\u1ea1n-k\u1ef3 kh\u00f4ng.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1777,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"ngg_post_thumbnail":0,"h5ap_radio_sources":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[5,380,152,210,283],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-67915","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bien-khao","category-chuyen-luan","category-hoc-thuat","category-song-ngu","category-triet-hoc"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/damau.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67915","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/damau.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/damau.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/damau.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1777"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/damau.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67915"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/damau.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67915\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":67916,"href":"https:\/\/damau.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67915\/revisions\/67916"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/damau.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67915"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/damau.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67915"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/damau.org\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67915"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}